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Abstract
Cross-country differences in corporate income tax (CIT) rates create incentives for multinational
enterprises (MNEs) to manipulate the prices that they use for intracompany transactions (known
as transfer prices) to shift profits to countries with more favorable tax treatments. Such behavior
reduces the aggregate tax burden of an MNE thus increasing its worldwide after-tax profits, which
presumably increases stockholder value. However, this behavior also erodes the CIT bases of
countries, like the United States and other OECD countries, with relatively high CIT rates. To
mitigate such behavior, governments adopt and enforce anti-tax avoidance rules. In this paper, I
seek to gauge the effect on profit shifting of CIT-rate differentials among countries. I improve
upon the current practice to estimating this elasticity by constructing a measure of the stringency
with which countries enforce their anti-tax avoidance rules and take into account their incentive to
enforce them. I report evidence showing that the failure to account for the enforcement of anti-tax
avoidance rules and the incentive to enforce them results not only in biased estimates of the semielasticity of reported profits with respect to CIT-rate but also results in a misspecified empirical
model. I estimate the empirical model of reported profits using detailed annual data on more than
40,000 affiliates located in 28 countries during the period from 2008 to 2014. To illustrate the
practical consequences for tax policy analysis of correctly specifying the empirical model, I
conduct a policy simulation in which the United States reduces its CIT rate by 20 percent.
Key words: public finance, behavioral effect of taxes, base erosion profit shifting, transferpricing, and tax-avoidance
JEL Classification: F23, H25
Draft: January 20, 2017
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1. Introduction
Policy-makers and the public alike are paying increasing attention to issues involving international
taxation because, among other reasons, multinational enterprises (MNEs) are using increasingly
sophisticated tax planning strategies to minimize their worldwide tax liabilities. For example,
cross-country differences in corporate income tax (CIT) rates create incentives for MNEs to
manipulate the prices that they use for intracompany transactions (known as transfer prices) to
shift profits to countries with more favorable tax treatments. Doing so, without detection by the
tax authorities, decreases the MNE’s aggregate CIT liabilities and increases its worldwide aftertax profits which, presumably, increases shareholder value. However, such behavior by MNEs
erodes the tax bases of countries, like the United States and other OECD countries, with relatively
high CIT rates. Clausing (2015) estimates that the United States lost $111 billion in federal CIT
revenue in 2012 due to the illegal shifting by U.S.-based MNEs of $371 billion of corporate profits
to foreign affiliates.
Generally speaking, a country has two policy options at its disposal to deter so-called base
erosion profit shifting (BEPS) by MNEs. They can cut the CIT rate and/or adopt and enforce antitax avoidance regulations. Cutting the CIT rate to deter BEPS can be likened to international tax
competition to attract mobile capital. The he risk of countries cutting CIT rates is that it will lead
to a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ where governments repeatedly cut CIT rates in response to the tax cuts
of other countries in a repeated game of ‘tit-for-tat’.
The existing literature on BEPS (see, for example, Hines Jr & Rice, 1994; Huizinga &
Laeven, 2008; Lohse & Riedel, 2013), henceforth HR, HL, and LR, respectively, generally focuses
on estimating the semi-elasticity of reported profits with respect to CIT tax-rate differentials
among countries (henceforth referred to simply as the semi-elasticity of reported profits).1 At this
point, the alert reader may very well be puzzled. How does the semi-elasticity of reported profits
allow tax policy analyst to conclude anything about the effect of CIT-rate differentials among
countries on BEPS? The relationship between reported profits and BEPS is relatively

1

I estimate a semi-log specification of a model of reported profits. More specifically, the dependent variable in a
semi-log specification of the model is the natural logarithm of an affiliate’s reported profits and, on the right-handside of the regression equation, is the simple difference in the maximum statutory CIT rate of the host country of the
affiliate and that of the host country of the MNE’s ultimate owner. As a result, the estimated coefficient of the CITrate differential is a semi-elasticity rather than an elasticity which is the interpretation given to the estimated
coefficient in a double-log specification (see Olsen & Osmundsen, 2003 for further details on these points).
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straightforward. In contrast to reported profits which is observable, the true profits and the amount
of tax motivated profit shifting by an MNE’s affiliate is not observable. However, the reported
profit of an MNE’s affiliate is equal to its true profit minus the net amount of outbound profit
shifting, which may be positive or negative depending on the tax incentives facing the MNE, minus
the cost to the affiliate of engaging in intracompany transactions to illegally shift profits to a
foreign affiliate. In other words, the reported profit of an MNE’s affiliate is a negative function of
the net amount of outbound profit shifting in response to cross-country differences in CIT rates.
This relationship allows us to infer the effect of CIT-rate differentials on BEPS from the semielasticity of reported profits. This explains why the literature has settled upon this approach.
In this paper, I show that the current ‘state-of-the-art’- empirical models of reported profits
not only result in biased estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits but are also seriously
misspecified. First, existing studies fail to account for the stringency with which countries enforce
their transfer-pricing rules. Yet, countries with relatively high CIT rates are more likely to adopt
and more stringently enforce transfer-pricing rules to mitigate BEPS. Therefore, empirical models
of reported profits which do not control for the stringency with which countries enforce their antitax avoidance rules may result in inconsistent estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits
due to omitted variable bias. To be fair, existing approaches to estimating the semi-elasticity of
reported profits do include controls for the adoption of anti-tax avoidance regulations, particularly
transfer-pricing rules, by countries over time. However, adopting transfer-pricing rules is
necessary but not sufficient to mitigate BEPS. A country must also enforce its rules and apply
penalties for detected violations by domestic affiliates of MNEs to deter BEPS.
The second reason that existing practice may result in biased estimates of the semielasticity of reported profits is that the CIT-rate differential is potentially endogenous because of
international tax competition among countries aimed at stemming BEPS. Again, there are a few
studies that use instrumental variables to estimate their models of reported profits; however, the
overwhelming majority of studies do not appear to address this issue in the estimation of their
models of reported profits.
Third, and certainly most seriously, researchers have not accounted for the incentives of
countries to enforce their transfer-pricing rules in the specification of their empirical models of
reported profits. More specifically, a country seeking to mitigate BEPS should only monitor the
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transfer-pricing practices of domestic affiliates of MNEs engaged in intracompany transactions
involving foreign affiliates located in countries with lower CIT rates than its own. Since a country’s
tax administration must use scarce resources to enforce transfer-pricing rules, countries should not
monitor the transfer pricing practices of domestic affiliates of MNEs engaging in intracompany
transactions involving the foreign affiliates located in countries with higher CIT rates than its own.
In this case, the domestic affiliate has no incentive to shift profits to the foreign affiliate; to do so
would increase the aggregate tax burden of the MNE. More specifically, countries with high CIT
rates should use scarce administrative resources to monitor the transfer pricing practices of
domestic affiliates of MNEs engaging in intracompany transactions with foreign affiliates located
in low CIT-rate countries. And, researchers striving to provide consistent estimates of the semielasticity of reported profits should take these incentives into account when specifying and
estimating an empirical model of reported profits.
To address these three concerns, I construct a dummy variable for the stringency with
which a country enforces its transfer-pricing rules. The enforcement dummy variable reflects both
the level of transfer-pricing documentation that a country requires domestic affiliates of MNEs to
submit with its annual CIT return, and the frequency with which the host country applies penalties
for violations of its transfer-pricing rules. In constructing the enforcement dummy variable for a
given country, the specification of the model accounts for whether the incentives facing the
domestic affiliate of the MNE and thus whether the host country should monitor the affiliate’s
transfer-pricing practices. As discussed in greater detail below, I show that the functional form of
the empirical model must be sufficiently flexible to allow for the estimation of potentially three
distinct semi-elasticities of reported profits.
Following the existing literature, I estimate my model of reported profits using detailed
firm-level data for the period 2008 to 2014. In contrast to the sample periods used in previous
studies, my sample period spans the Great Recession.2 The sample, which is constructed from the
Orbis database, contains information on 43,103 affiliates located in 28 countries. Since the sample
includes affiliates with ultimate owners located in a variety of developing, developed, and tax
haven countries, there is considerable heterogeneity in the combinations of CIT-rate differentials
and transfer-pricing enforcement regimes in my sample. This variation should be helpful in
2

Orbis is Bureau van Dijk's flagship database of private and listed company information from around the world that
emphases the ownership linkages among firms that belong to the same multinational enterprise.
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identifying the parameter estimates of the model. Using this sample, I estimate a firm-level,
instrumental variables, fixed-effects, panel-data model of reported profits to gauge the effect of
CIT-rate differentials among countries on reported profits of an MNE’s affiliate.
I develop a theoretical model of tax motivated profit shifting which also accounts for the
incentives of countries to enforce their transfer-pricing rules. The comparative statics of the model
show that there are potentially three distinct semi-elasticities of reported profits with respect to
CIT-rate differentials among countries. Based on this finding, I specify an empirical model of
reported profits which is sufficiently flexible to permit the simultaneous estimation of these three
semi-elasticities of reported profits. Specifically, I estimate a semi-elasticity of reported profits
when the tax incentives favor outbound (inbound) profit shifting because the host country of the
MNE’s subsidiary (ultimate owner) has a greater CIT-rate than the host-country of the MNE’s
ultimate owner (subsidiary). This accounts for two of the three semi-elasticities of reported profits.
I estimate a third semi-elasticity of reported profits for the case in which neither country has
adopted transfer-pricing rules or fails to enforce them.
My preferred estimate, when countries enforce their transfer-pricing rules, is -3.2 (-1.0) for
the semi-elasticity of reported profits when the tax incentives favor outbound (inbound) profit
shifting. The estimated semi-elasticity of -3.2 implies that a 10 percent increase in the CIT-rate
differential results in a 32 percent decrease in an affiliates’ reported profits due to outbound profit
shifting. The estimated semi-elasticity of -1.0 implies that a 10 percent decrease in the CIT-rate
differential results in a 10 percent increase in an affiliates’ reported profits due to inbound profit
shifting. My preferred estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profit when neither country has
adopted transfer-pricing rules or fails to enforce them is equal to -3.5, meaning that a ten percent
increase in the CIT-rate differential results in a 35 percent decrease in the affiliates’ reported
profits.
Finally, to illustrate the practical consequences for tax policy analysis of correctly
specifying the empirical model of reported profits, I conduct a policy simulation. I assume the
United States reduces its CIT rate by 20 percentage points, which results in a proposed-law CIT
rate of 15 percent. This is approximately equal to the median CIT rate of OECD countries. I use
my preferred estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits as well as a single estimate of
the semi-elasticity obtained using a state-of-the-art but seriously misspecified model to conduct
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the policy simulation. This exercise shows that using consistent estimates of the semi-elasticities
obtained from a correctly specified model has a substantial effect on the estimated CIT tax revenue
effect of the proposed reform.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 consists of a brief overview
of the literature on estimating the semi-elasticity of reported profits. In particular, I focus on those
studies that control for the adoption of transfer-pricing rules by countries over time. Section 3
describes a simple theoretical model of tax motived profit shifting by MNEs and analyzes the
comparative statics of the model. Section 4 describes the data and construction of the sample used
to estimate the empirical model, the econometric specification of the model of profit shifting, and
the construction of the variables. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. I report the results of
the policy simulation in the subsequent section, and Section 7 concludes.

2. Literature review
It is beyond the scope of the present study to provide a comprehensive review of the vast literature
on BEPS.3 Therefore, we proceed below by reviewing some of the seminal papers in this literature.
The literature on tax-motivated, international profit shifting focuses on gauging the effect
of CIT-rate differentials on the reported profit of the affiliates of MNEs. Due to the large variety
of methodologies, data, and sample periods used in this literature, it is difficult to compare
estimates. Heckemeyer & Overesh (2013), however, seek to provide a consensus estimate of the
semi-elasticity of reported profits by conducting a meta-analysis of the available estimates in the
literature while controlling for the diversity of approaches. They report a consensus estimate of
-0.8, meaning that a 10 percent increase in the CIT-rate differential among countries causes an 8
percent decrease in the reported profits of an MNE’s affiliate.
The literature on BEPS generally follows the practice introduced by HR. They assume that
the true profit of an MNE’s affiliate is generated by a Cobb-Douglas production function. They
further assume that it is a function of capital, labor, and technological change. They use the natural
logarithm of these variables as regressors in their empirical model to control for the true profits
earned by the MNE’s affiliate in a given country. Using aggregate time-series data, HR and Gruber

3

See Heckemeyer & Overessh (2013) and Dharmapala (2014) for up-to-date and excellent reviews of the literature
on BEPS.
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& Mutti (1991) report evidence of a decrease in the reported profits of subsidiaries located in
countries with high CIT rates. In addition to not accounting for the enforcement of anti-tax
avoidance rules, they do not account for the role of CIT rates in other countries in which an MNE
has a presence.
To address the latter issue, HL estimate a model of reported profits using a 1999 crosssection of firm-level data for 12 European countries. They use the weighted-average (by the size
of the affiliate) CIT rates of countries in which an MNE has a presence to calculate the CIT-rate
differential facing an MNE’s affiliate. They report an estimated semi-elasticity of reported profits
with respect to the weighted-average, CIT-rate differential of -1.3. Dischinger, Knoll, & Riedel
(2014) and Lohse & Riedel (2013) also report evidence consistent with BEPS by MNEs. They
show that reported profits are greater (less) than predicted for affiliates located in countries with
relatively low (high) CIT rates.
To their credit, Dharmapala & Riedel (2013) and LR make an important methodological
contribution to specification of models of reported profit by including a control variable for the
existence of transfer-pricing rules by country and over time. As previously discussed, however,
the mere existence of transfer-pricing rules is necessary but not sufficient to deter BEPS. Countries
must also enforce their anti-tax avoidance regulations if they are going to have a deterrent effect
on the tax planning strategies of MNEs. Since I contend that the stringency with which a country
enforces its transfer-pricing rules plays an important role in correctly specifying a model of
reported profits and consistently estimating the semi-elasticity of reported profits, I proceed below
by carefully describing the approaches used in the literature to control for transfer-pricing rules by
country and over time.
Although Bartelsman & Beetsma (2003) do not focus on the effect of transfer-pricing rules
on BEPS, they do introduce a control variable for transfer-pricing rules as a robustness check of
their estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits. They do so by constructing an index of
transfer-pricing rules for each country in their sample based on the following three criteria: (1) a
country’s adoption of transfer-pricing rules; (2) the country requires domestic affiliates of MNEs
to provide transfer-pricing documentation with its annual CIT return; and (3) the country’s
adoption of penalties for violating transfer-pricing rules. They estimate their model of reported
profits using a sample of 16 countries. As expected, they report evidence that the responsiveness
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of reported value added to CIT-rate differentials among countries is stronger for observations in
countries with less stringent rules than it is for observations located in countries with more
stringent rules. The potential limitations of this approach are twofold. First, their estimate may not
be identified because of the limited number of countries in their sample which may result in a lack
of sufficient variation in the index of transfer-pricing rules. Second, and more importantly, their
control variable for the existence of transfer-pricing rules does not account for whether countries
are actually assessing penalties on domestic affiliates of MNEs for violations of their transferpricing rules.
Lohrse & Riedel (2012, 2013) also include an index for transfer-pricing rules based on a
country’s documentation requirements. In their specification of the econometric model, they
include an interaction term between the index for the existence of transfer-pricing rules and the
CIT-rate differential among countries. This allows the estimate of semi-elasticity of reported
profits to differ for affiliates of MNEs located in countries with documentation requirements and
for those located in countries without such requirements. They conclude that transfer-pricing
regulations are an important strategy for governments seeking to deter BEPS. However, they also
do not account for whether countries actually enforce for their transfer-pricing rules.
Klessen & Laplante (2012) look deeply into the interaction between the regulatory costs to
an MNE’s affiliate of the “enforcement” of transfer-pricing rules and a proxy variable for income
shifting. They estimate their model using a sample of MNEs located in the United States. Their
measure of enforcement is the IRS audit rate for large corporations. This is arguably an imprecise
measure of the enforcement of transfer-pricing rules. As a proxy for regulatory costs, they use the
weighted average of the existence and enforcement of transfer-pricing rules among the major
trading partners of the United States. They conclude that U.S. companies are becoming more active
at shifting income out of the United States as the regulatory costs of shifting have changed over
time.
Beer & Loeprick (2013) study the effect of the introduction of transfer-pricing rules on the
time path of reported profits. They find that within four years of introducing a rule requiring
transfer-pricing documentation to be submitted with an MNE’s annual CIT return, the reported
profits of a subsidiary decreases by approximately 60 percent. Theirs is an innovative way of
thinking about the regulator costs of transfer-pricing rules. At the risk of being repetitive, their
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econometric specification does not include a control variable for whether a country actually
enforces its documentation requirements.
The present research makes the following contributions to the literature on BEPS. First,
my econometric specification includes a control variable that accounts for the enforcement of
transfer-pricing rules. This variable was painfully constructed using information gleaned from
reviewing hundreds of reports issued by KPMG and Ernst & Young. Second, in constructing the
enforcement dummy variable, I account for the incentives of the host country to enforce its
transfer-pricing rules vis-à-vis a foreign affiliate of the MNE based on the prevailing CIT-rate
differential between those the host countries. In constructing the enforcement dummy variable, I
use the rules of the ultimate owner’s host country when that country’s top statutory CIT rate is
greater than that of the foreign subsidiary’s host country and, vice versa, I use the rules of the
foreign subsidiary’s host country when that country has a top statutory CIT rate that is greater than
that of the ultimate owner’s host country. The rationale for constructing the enforcement dummy
variable in this manner is straightforward: countries should only monitor the transfer-pricing
practices when a domestic affiliate of an MNE is engaging in intracompany transactions with a
foreign affiliate located in a country with a lower CIT rate than its own. When a domestic affiliate’s
host country has a lower CIT rate than that for the foreign affiliate’s host country, there is simply
no risk of BEPS.
Third, consistent with the theoretical predictions of the theory, the specification of my
empirical model is sufficiently flexible to allow for the simultaneous estimation of three separate
semi-elasticities of reported profit. Fourth, the sample used to estimate the model includes a larger
number of countries, including developing, developed, and tax haven countries, than those used in
previous studies. Consequently, there is likely to be greater heterogeneity in the sample in terms
of the combinations of CIT-rate differentials among countries and the values of the enforcement
dummy variable used in this study. The added variation among the independent variables should
be helpful in identifying estimated parameters of the model. Fifth, I estimate an instrument
variables model to address the potential endogeneity of the CIT-rate differentials among countries
in my sample.
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3. A simple model of tax motivated profit shifting by an MNE
In this section, we describe a simple model of tax-motivated, international profit shifting of an
MNE and derive the comparative statics of the model. The comparative static results of the model
are useful in guiding the specification of the empirical model and also provide an entirely new set
of testable hypotheses that are an important focus of the econometric exercise discussed in the
subsequent section of this study.
A fundamental concept in this section is the reported profit of an MNE’s affiliate, which is
defined as follows:
πRJ

=

πTJ

γj Sj2
− Sj −
2 πTj

(1)

Where 𝜋𝑗𝑅 is the reported profit of an MNE’s affiliate j (= 1,…, n) located in country J (= 1,…, n);
tJ is the CIT rate of country J; 𝜋𝑗𝑇 is the true profit earned by the MNE in country J; Sj is the net
amount of outbound profit shifting by the MNE’s affiliate j; and 𝛾𝐽 𝑆𝑗2⁄2𝜋𝑗𝑇 is the total cost to
affiliate j of engaging in intracompany transactions to illegally shift profits to a foreign affiliate.
These costs are assumed to be increasing in the stringency with which country J enforces its antitax avoidance rules, which is denoted by γJ. This policy parameter is assumed to be greater than
or equal to zero. As discussed in greater detail below, I assume that γJ = 0, when country J has not
incentive to enforce its transfer-pricing rules. In addition, the total costs of engaging in illegal
profit shifting to a foreign affiliate is a positive function of the ratio of the square of the net amount
of outbound profit shifting and the true profit of the MNE’s affiliate j. The quadratic specification
of the cost function captures the assumption that the costs to the affiliate increase with the square
of the net amount of illegal outbound profit shifting.
Following HR and HL, we assume that an MNE seeks to maximize worldwide after-tax
profits subject to the constraint that the sum of net outbound profit-shifting by all n affiliates of
the MNE is equal to zero. Furthermore, I assume an affiliate’s net outbound profit shifting may be
positive or negative depending on the tax incentives facing the MNE in particular countries. The
resulting constrained optimization problem can be written as follows:
n

max V =

∑ πRj
j=1

n

= ∑(1 −
j=1

t J ) (πTJ

γj Sj2
− Sj −
),
2 πTj

(2)
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subject to ∑𝑛𝑗=1 𝑆𝑗 = 0.
To simplify the model, we assume that the MNE only has two affiliates: a foreign affiliate
g located in country G, and an affiliate h located in the MNE’s home country H. The Lagrange
expression for (2) is given by the following expression:
L=

(1 − t G ) ( 𝜋𝑇𝑔

𝛾𝐺 𝑆2𝑔
𝛾𝐻 𝑆2ℎ
𝑇
(1
)
− 𝑆𝑔 −
)
+
−
t
(
𝜋
−
𝑆
−
) − 𝜆(𝑆𝑔 + 𝑆ℎ ).
H
ℎ
ℎ
2 𝜋𝑇𝑔
2 𝜋𝑇ℎ

(3)

Where λ is a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint that the sum of Sj must equal zero; tJ is the CIT
rate of country J (= G, H); 𝜋𝑗𝑇 is the true profit of affiliate j (= g or h) earned in country J (= G or
H, respectively); and Sj is the net amount of outbound profits being illegally shifted abroad by
affiliate j (= g or h).
Without loss of generality, we assume that the CIT rate of country G is greater than that of
country H or tG – tH > 0. Given the tax incentives created by (tG – tH) > 0, the MNE should seek to
shift profits from the foreign affiliate g to the home affiliate h. This action by the MNE will
increase country H’s CIT base and consequently its CIT revenues. Given these circumstances,
country H has no incentive to spend scarce administrative resources monitoring the transfer pricing
practices of a domestic affiliate in so far as it is engaging in intracompany transactions with the
foreign affiliate g. There is simply no risk that the domestic affiliate h will seek to illegally shift
profits to the foreign affiliate by strategically using transfer prices to understate the true profit
earned in country H. If, however, affiliate g is engaging in intracompany transactions with affiliate
h, country G should monitor affiliate g’s transfer-pricing practices to deter BEPS. Therefore, we
assume 𝛾𝐺 > 0 and 𝛾𝐻 < 0.
The necessary first order conditions for a maximum are given as follows:
𝛿𝐿
𝛿𝑆𝑖

= −(1 − t I ) (1 +

𝛾𝐼 𝑆𝑖
𝜋𝑖𝑇

) = 𝜆.

(4)

Where i = g or h, and I = G or H. Solving these two equations simultaneously for affiliate g’s
optimal level of outbound profit shifting results in the following expression:
𝑆𝑔∗ =

𝑡𝐺 −𝑡𝐻
𝛾𝐺

𝑇
𝜋𝑔

((1−𝑡 ) )
𝐺

(5)

The signs of the expressions on the right-hand-side of (5) implies that 𝑆𝑔∗ > 0, meaning that affiliate
g should shift profits to affiliate h. This in turn implies that affiliate g’s reported profits will be less
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than the true profits earned in country G. Finally, the constraint Sg + Sh = 0 implies that 𝑆ℎ∗ = − 𝑆𝑔∗
< 0, meaning that affiliate h is receiving inbound profit shifting, which, in turn, implies its reported
profits are greater than the true profits earned in country H. According to (5), affiliate g’s optimal
level of outbound profit shifting is positively related to tG – tH, inversely related to γG, and
independent of γH
Differentiating (5) by the policy parameters available to country G to deter BEPS,
specifically tG – tH and γG, results in the following two expressions:
∂S∗g
∂(tG −tH )

=

πT
g
γG (1 − tG )

> 0 and

∂Sg∗
πTg (t G − t H )
=− 2
< 0.
∂γG
γG (1 − t G )

(6)

(7)

From (6), there is a positive relationship between the CIT-rate differential tG – tH and affiliate g’s
optimal level of outbound profit shifting, and (6) implies that there is a negative relationship
between the stringency with which country G enforces its transfer-pricing rules γG and affiliate g’s
optimal level of outbound profit shifting.
As previously discussed, the amount of illegal profit shifting among affiliates of an MNE
is not observable; therefore, (6) and (7) are difficult to test empirically. Since an affiliate’s reported
profits are observable, we recast the comparative static results derived above in terms of the effect
of G’s policy parameters on affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits. Substituting (5) into (1)
and differentiating the resulting expression by the policy parameters available to G to mitigate
BEPS, we obtain the following expressions:4
∗

𝜕𝜋𝑔𝑅
𝜋𝑔𝑇 𝜋𝑔𝑇 (𝑡𝐺 − 𝑡𝐻 )
= −( −
) < 0,
𝜕(𝑡𝐺 − 𝑡𝐻 )
𝛾𝐺
𝛾𝐺 (1 − 𝑡𝐺 )

(8)

∗

𝜕𝜋𝑔𝑅
𝜋𝑔𝑇 (𝑡𝐺 − 𝑡𝐻 )2 𝜋𝑔𝑇 (𝑡𝐺 − 𝑡𝐻 )
=(
−
) > 0 , and
𝜕𝛾𝐺
𝛾𝐺 (1 − 𝑡𝐺 )
𝛾𝐺
𝑅
𝜕 2 𝜋𝑔

∗

𝜕(𝑡𝐺 −𝑡𝐻 )𝜕𝛾𝐺

4

=(

𝑇
𝜋𝑔

𝛾𝐺2

−

𝑇 (𝑡 −𝑡 )
𝜋𝑔
𝐺 𝐻

𝛾𝐺2 (1−𝑡𝐺 )

) > 0.

Substituting (5) into (1) results in the following expression for affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits:
∗

𝜋𝑔𝑅 = 𝜋𝑔𝑇 [1 −

(𝑡𝐺 −𝑡𝐻 )
𝛾𝐺

−

(𝑡𝐺−𝑡𝐻 )2
(1−𝑡𝐺)

].

(9)

(10)
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From (8), there is an inverse relationship between affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits and
the CIT-rate differential; (9) shows a positive relationship between affiliate g’s optimal level of
reported profits and the stringency with which country G enforces its transfer-pricing rules.
Finally, (10) implies that increasing the stringency with which country G enforces its transferpricing rules decreases (in absolute value) the effect of the CIT-rate differential on affiliate g’s
optimal level of reported profits. In other words, increasing the stringency with which a country
enforces its transfer-pricing rules deters BEPS for every positive value of the CIT-rate differential
between countries G and H.
A graph illustrating the implications of (8) - (10) for the relationships between affiliate g’s
optimal level of reported profits and the CIT-rate differential may help in understanding the
comparative static results of this model. Figure 1 illustrates the relationships between affiliate g’s
optimal level of reported profits and the CIT-rate differential. As we will see, the relationships
crucially depend on the stringency with which country G (H) enforces its transfer-pricing rules.
∗

The vertical axis of Figure 1 represents affiliate g’s reported profit 𝜋𝑔𝑅 and the horizontal
axis represents the CIT-rate differential between countries G and H, which is denoted by (tG – tH).
The CIT-rate differential can be greater than, less than, or equal to zero. When the CIT-rate
differential is equal to zero, there is no incentive for either affiliate to shift profits to the other;
therefore, affiliate g’s reported profits are equal to its true profits when tG = tH. This point is labeled
T on the vertical axis of Figure 1. Furthermore, if the reported profits of the affiliates are
independent of the CIT-rate differential, then affiliate g’s reported profits would always be equal
to its true profits. Assuming for the sake of simplicity that affiliate g’s true profit is exogeneous
(i.e., independent of the CIT-rate differential), then affiliate g’s reported profit would equal its true
profit for every value of (tG – tH). This case is illustrated by the horizontal line and labeled ̅̅̅̅
𝐴𝐵 and
passing through point T. This line provides a useful reference in following discussion.
According to (8) – (10), we must analyze three distinct cases. First, let’s suppose neither
country adopts transfer-pricing rules in which case γG = γH = 0. In this case, there is an inverse
relationship between affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits and (tG – tH) This relationship is
illustrated in Figure 1 by the negatively sloped line segment labeled ̅̅̅̅
𝐶𝐷. When (tG – tH) < 0, then
affiliate h has an incentive to shift profits to the foreign affiliate g in which case affiliate g’s
reported profits are greater than its true profits. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the fact that that
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̅̅̅̅, which represents affiliate g’s reported profits, lies
the negatively sloped line segment labeled 𝐶𝑇
̅̅̅̅ , which represents affiliate g’s true profits. The vertical distance between
above the line labelled 𝐴𝐵
̅̅̅̅ and ̅̅̅̅
𝐶𝑇
𝐴𝐵 represents affiliate h’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting, which is equal to the
amount of inbound profit shifting received by to affiliate g, for every value of (tG – tH) < 0.
Now, let’s consider the range of the horizontal axis where tG – tH > 0. In this situation,
affiliate g has an incentive to shift profits to firm h, or 𝑆𝑔∗ > 0, and, as a result, the reported profits
of affiliate g are less than its true profits. This is illustrated in Figure 1 by the fact that the negatively
̅̅̅̅ , representing affiliate g’s optimal level of reported profits, lies
sloped line segment labeled 𝑇𝐷
below the horizontal line labelled ̅̅̅̅
𝐴𝐵 , representing the true profits of affiliate g, for every value
of tG – tH > 0. The vertical distance between ̅̅̅̅
𝑇𝐷 and ̅̅̅̅
𝐴𝐵 represents affiliate g’s optimal level of
outbound profit shifting at every value of (tG – tH) > 0.
For purposes of interpreting the empirical model, it is important to observe that the inverse
relationship between affiliate g’s reported profits and its optimal level of net outbound profit
shifting, which can be positive or negative depending on the tax incentives facing the MNE, is
evident in Figure 1, as well. As we move from left to right along the horizontal axis, the CIT-rate
differential is increasing; reported profits are decreasing; and affiliate g’s optimal amount of net
̅̅̅̅ illustrates (8) after
outbound profit shifting is increasing. The negatively sloped line labeled 𝐶𝐷
setting γG = 0.
Turning to the second case 2, consider the range of the horizontal axis where tG – tH < 0.
As previously discussed, affiliate h has an incentive to shift profits to the foreign affiliate g. Now,
in contrast to the previous case, country H enforces its transfer-pricing rules to prevent BEPS.
According to (10), enforcement decreases (in absolute value) outbound profit shifting by affiliate
h, and, consequently, we assume γH > 0. The effect of country H enforcing its transfer-pricing rules
on the optimal level of inbound profits being received by g with respect to the CIT-rate differential
is illustrated in Figure 1 by the negatively sloped line segment labeled ̅̅̅̅̅
𝐸𝑇 . This line segment is
̅̅̅̅ because country H is enforcing its transfer-pricing
not as steeply sloped as the line labeled 𝐶𝑇
rules. This has a deterrent effect on affiliate h’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting thus
decreasing the amount of inbound profits received by affiliate g at every value of tG – tH < 0.
The third case arises when tG – tH > 0, and country G enforces its transfer pricing rules to
deter BEPS, thus γG > 0. Again, according to (10) enforcement decreases (in absolute value)
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affiliate g’s optimal level of net outbound profit shifting at every value of tG – tH > 0. This is
̅̅̅̅ . Again, this line segment
illustrated in Figure 1 by the negatively sloped line segment labeled 𝑇𝐹
is not as steeply sloped as the line segment ̅̅̅̅
𝑇𝐷 because of the deterrent effect of country G
enforcing its transfer-pricing rules on affiliate g’s optimal level of outbound profit shifting.
I conclude this section with a couple of final observations. First, the line segment labeled
̅̅̅̅ may not have a constant slope. Indeed, there should be a kink in 𝐸𝐹
̅̅̅̅ at the point labelled T on
𝐸𝐹
the vertical axis of Figure 1 if γG ≠ γH, meaning that one country is enforcing its transfer-pricing
rules, when it has the incentive to do so, more stringently than the other country. Consequently,
the functional form of the empirical model should be flexible enough to permit the simultaneous
estimation of three distinct semi-elasticities of reported profit. Second, for expository reasons, I
assume that true profits are exogenous. If, however, a country’s CIT rate distorts the real activity
of domestic affiliates of MNEs, as seems likely, then this could be illustrated in Figure 1 by rotating
the three lines counter-clockwise about the point labeled T on the vertical axis. This also shows
the necessity of controlling for true profits in the empirical model.

4. Sample construction, econometric specification, and variable construction
In this section, we describe the data and the construction of the sample used to estimate the
empirical model, the econometric specification of the empirical model of reported profits, and the
variable construction.

4.1 The data and sample construction
To estimate the model, I use firm-level data. Such data are not readily available. At the moment,
there are only three government entities that collect information on MNEs: The Bureau of
Economic Analysis’s (BEA) Operations and Management Companies Database in the U.S.,
Deutsche Bundesbank’s Microdatabase on Direct Investments (MIDI), and the United Kingdom’s
Office for National Statistics annual inquiry into Foreign Direct Investment (AFDI).
Unfortunately, these databases are not publicly available. Fortunately, some private institutions,
such as Capital IQ (COMPUSTAT and Capital IQ Platform) and Bureau Van Dijk-BvD (Orbis
and Amadeus), offer various platforms that contain information on company profits, costs,
performance, and other indicators. These datasets are frequently used by firms providing
accounting services to MNEs and by tax enforcement authorities, such as the IRS to take one
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example. These data are often used by scholars interested in corporate finance and international
tax issues and are frequently cited in the academic literature.
I construct a sample of affiliates of MNEs from the Orbis (BvD) database which contains
information on over 200 million private companies worldwide. One of the limitations of using
these data for the task at hand is that ownership information is only available for the most recent
year of the data. Indeed, when applying the match of the current year to prior years, it is possible
to obtain mismatches between parents and subsidiary firms, particularly when there have been
mergers and acquisitions during the intervening years. As noted in previous studies that use these
data (Dharmapala & Riedel, 2013; Dischinger et al., 2014; Huizinga & Laeven, 2008), this is an
unfortunate but unavoidable limitation of using these data. Since mergers and acquisitions are
relatively infrequent events, particularly during the time period spanned by my sample, I believe
that any bias resulting from using these data is relatively small.
I construct the sample, which I use to estimate the model, from the Orbis database by
excluding firms with the following characteristics: subsidiaries firms, inactive firms, firms with
losses, non-industrial firms (banks, hedge funds, foundations, insurance, public authorities,
trustees, venture capital, and others), small firms as defined by Orbis and firms with an ultimate
owner located in the same country.5 Ultimate owners are excluded from the sample to prevent
perfect multicollinearity due to the adding-up constraint that profit-shifting must sum to zero.
Loss-making firms are excluded from the sample because they are subject to specific accounting
rules; incorporating these rules into the empirical model is beyond the scope of the current study.
After applying these exclusion criteria to the dataset, the resulting sample consists of 48,309
subsidiaries for the period 2008 to 2014. Tables 1 and 2 report the number subsidiaries and ultimate
owners in the sample by country, respectively. I augment the firm-level data with country-level
data drawn from a variety of sources, as discussed in greater detail below.

4.2 The econometric specification
To test the predictions derived from the theoretical model, I adapt the econometric specification
pioneered by HR and HL. More specifically, I estimate the following fixed-effects, instrumental
variables, panel data model:

5

Ultimate owners are excluded from the data set because the same semi-elasticity of BEPS is calculated using the
differential between an affiliate of an MNE and its ultimate owner.
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𝑟
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝜋𝑔𝑡
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 (𝑡𝐺𝑡 − 𝑡𝐻𝑡 ) + 𝛽2 (𝑡𝐺𝑡 − 𝑡𝐻𝑡 )𝛾𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽3 (𝑡𝐺𝑡 − 𝑡𝐻𝑡 )𝛾𝐻𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝛾𝐺𝑡 + 𝛽5 𝛾𝐻𝑡

+ 𝛽6 log(𝑘𝑔𝑡 ) + 𝛽7 log(𝑙𝑔𝑡 ) + 𝛽8 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑎𝐺𝑡 ) + 𝛽9 𝜔𝐺𝑡 + ∑ 𝜎𝑠𝑡 + 𝑢𝑔𝑡 .

(10)

The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of affiliate g’s reported profits in country G and
year t. The CIT-rate differential for countries G and H, respectively, in year t, is denoted by tGt tHt, and, as discussed in greater detail below, 𝛾𝐺𝑡 and 𝛾𝐻𝑡 are dummy variables reflecting the
stringency with which countries G and H, respectively, enforce their transfer-pricing rules while
also accounting for their incentives to do so. The interaction terms involving the CIT-rate
differential and the enforcement dummy variables provide the necessary flexibility to estimate the
three distinct semi-elasticities of reported profits predicted by the theory.
The right-hand-side variables kgt and lgt, denote the value of firm g’s capital assets and labor
costs, respectively. The variable aGt denotes country G’s real GDP per capita, which serves as a
proxy variable for the rate of technological change. Following the methodology pioneered by HR,
these variables are included in the model to control for the true profit earned by affiliate g in
country G. The variable ωGt is a vector of country and time specific characteristics, namely indexes
of trade freedom and political stability; ϭst is an industry-year fixed effect; and ugt is a stochasticerror term, which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and constant variance.
The model is estimated using an instrumental variable for the potentially endogenous
variables in (10) involving the CIT-rate differential. Following HR and HL, I use the log difference
in the populations of the affiliates’ and ultimate owner’s host countries as an instrument for the
potentially endogenous variable. The intuition behind using this instrument is that tax haven
countries tend to be sparsely populated island countries, often located in the Caribbean. In contrast,
high CIT-rate countries tend to be more populous OECD countries. I conduct Hausman-Wu
specification tests for each model. These tests reject the null hypothesis that the variables involving
the CIT-rate differential are exogeneous. I also conduct a Wright-Yogo test which rejects the null
hypothesis that the log difference in populations is a weak instrument. In short, I believe that the
log difference in populations is a valid instrument. It is sufficiently correlated with the potentially
endogenous variables. Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that it belongs in the model of
reported profits; so the exclusion restriction is valid, as well.
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4.3 Construction of the variables
The dependent variable is measured by the natural logarithm of reported earnings before interest
and taxes (EBIT). Firm-level information on reported EBIT, the value of fixed assets, and labor
costs by year are from the Orbis database. The CIT-rate differential is constructed using the
maximum statutory CIT rates of an affiliate’s and ultimate owner’s host countries. These data
come from Bloomberg and various issues of Ernst & Young’s Worldwide Corporate Tax Guides,
KPMG’s Global Corporate Tax Summaries, and Price-Waterhouse-Cooper’s Global Corporate
Tax Summaries.
The stringency with which a country enforces its transfer-pricing rules is a dummy variable
which is built by the product of two constructed variables. One of the constructed variables is a
trichotomous variable reflecting the level of documentation that a country requires a domestic
affiliate of MNE to submit with its CIT return. The second constructed variable is also a
trichotomous variable reflecting the frequency with which a country applies penalties for violating
its transfer-pricing documentation requirements. Information used to construct these variables
comes from Ernst & Young’s Worldwide Transfer Pricing Reference Guide and KPMG’s Transfer
Pricing Review by country and by year. Table 3 summarizes the criteria used to construct the
categorical variables measuring the level of a country’s documentation requirements and the
frequency with which a country applies penalties for failing to comply with its transfer-pricing
documentation requirements.
The product of these two constructed categorical variables results in a variable with the
following six values: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 9. For ease of reference, let’s refer to this variable as the
stringency measure. The enforcement dummy variable in (10) is constructed by setting it equal to
one when the stringency measure is greater than or equal to four, and zero otherwise. To test the
robustness of the model, as discussed in greater detail below, I also estimate a specification in
which the enforcement variable is set equal to one when the stringency measure is greater than or
equal to five. This change in the definition of the enforcement dummy variable has no appreciable
effect on the estimated coefficients.
Data on GDP per capita and the index of trade freedom by country and year come from
the World Bank’s Development Indicators (World Bank Group) and the Heritage Foundation’s
Index of Economic Freedom, respectively. Table 4 reports sample summary statistics.
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5. The empirical results
Now, we turn to the discussion of the empirical results. Since the focus of this research is obtaining
consistent estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits, I report estimates of this parameter
for a variety of specifications in Table 5. All specifications include a full set of firm and industryyear fixed effects, and I report robust standard errors clustered at the MNE level.
For the sake of comparison, I estimate a “first-generation model of reported profits,” using
my sample. This specification does not include a control variable for countries with transfer pricing
rules. This estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits is reported in the row labelled Firstgeneration model and the second column of Table 5. The estimate is equal to -1.789 and it is
distinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. This estimate has the
expected sign. The full set of estimated coefficients for this specification are reported in the second
column of Table 6. For reasons previously discussed, I believe this model is misspecificied and
the estimate of the semi-elasticity is inconsistent.
Second-generation models include a variety of ways to control for whether a country has
transfer-pricing rules. Accordingly, I estimate two versions of the second-generation model, using
my sample. In version of the model that I refer to as the second-generation model A, I follow the
practice in the literature of controlling for whether a country has adopted transfer-pricing rules by
including a dummy variable equal to one when the subsidiary’s host country requires that the
affiliates of MNEs submit documentation of their transfer-pricing practices. This generation of
models includes an interaction term between the CIT-rate differential and the dummy variable
controlling for the adoption of transfer-pricing rules. As a result, there are two distinct estimates
of the semi-elasticity of reported profits. There is an estimate for the case in which the host country
does not have transfer pricing rules, and there is an estimate for the case in which the host country
of the subsidiary requires submission of documentation of the affiliates’ transfer pricing practices.
The former estimate is reported in the row labelled Second-generation model A and the second
column of Table 5. This estimate is equal to -1.589. Consistent with the theory, the estimate is
negative and statistically different from zero at conventional levels of significance. The latter
estimate is equal to -1.039; however, it is not distinguishable from zero at conventional levels of
statistical significance. The estimated coefficients for this specification are reported in the third
column of Table 6.
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In the specification that I refer to as the second-generation model B, I follow the practice
in the literature of controlling for a country’s adoption of transfer-pricing rules, which may or may
not include documentation of the affiliates’ transfer-pricing practices, by including a dummy
variable set equal to one when the host country of the subsidiary has adopted transfer-pricing rules
of some type and zero otherwise. I also include an interaction term between the CIT-rate
differential and the dummy variable controlling for foreign subsidiary’s adoption of transferpricing rules. The estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits are reported in the row
labelled second-generation model B of Table 5 and are equal to -9.435 and -1.811, respectively.
Consistent with the theory, the estimates are negative and statistically different from zero at
conventional levels of significance.
Second-generation models are an improvement over first-generation model because they
control for whether countries have adopted transfer-pricing rules. However, for these reasons
previously discussed, these models are misspecified and the estimated semi-elasticities are
inconsistent. These models do not account for which country – the host country of the subsidiary
or of the ultimate owner – has adopted transfer-pricing rules, enforces these rules, and has the
incentive to do so.
Now, I estimate (10) in which I include a dummy variable to control for whether a country
enforces its transfer-pricing rules and which country – the host of the affiliate or the ultimate owner
-- has an incentive to do so. In this specification of the model, there are two interaction terms with
the CIT-rate differential. There is an interaction term for the case in which the host country of the
affiliate (ultimate owner) has adopted transfer-pricing rules and has the incentive to enforce them.
Therefore, this specification results in three potentially distinct values of the semi-elasticity of
reported profits.6 The estimated coefficients of this specification are reported in the fourth column
of Table 6.
The estimated semi-elasticity for the case in which neither country enforces its transferpricing rules is reported in the row labeled Enforcement model 1 and the second column of Table
5. The estimated semi-elasticity is equal to -3.540 and is distinguishable from zero at conventional

6

These three semi-elasticities are defined in terms of (10) by the following expressions:
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where the subscripts G and H are for the host country of the affiliate and ultimate owner, resespectively.

= 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 ,
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levels of statistical significance. This estimate implies a ten-percent increase in the CIT-rate
differential results in a 35 percent decrease in reported profits, which is substantial. The estimate
reported in the corresponding row and third column of Table 5 is for the case in which the foreign
affiliate’s host country has adopted, enforces its rules, and has the incentive to do so because tG –
tH > 0. This estimate of the semi-elasticity of reported profits is equal to -3.063, meaning that a
ten-percent increase in the CIT-rate differential results in an approximately 30 percent decrease in
reported profits. Consistent with the theory, this estimate is negative and statistically
distinguishable from zero at the ten-percent level. Furthermore, it is somewhat greater (in absolute
value) than the previous estimate when countries do not enforce transfer-pricing rules. As reported
in the corresponding row and third column of Table 5, the semi-elasticity of reported profits is
equal to -1.286 and is statistically distinguishable from zero at the 5-percent level. This semielasticity corresponds to the case in which the ultimate owner’s host country has adopted transferpricing rules, enforces its rules, and has the incentive to do so because tG – tH < 0. This estimate
implies a ten-percent increase in the CIT-rate differential results in an approximately 13 percent
decrease in reported profits. As predicted by the theory, this estimate is smaller (in absolute value)
than the estimate when neither country enforces its rules. It is also interesting to note that the
estimates for the cases when the subsidiary’s and ultimate owner’s host countries have the
incentive to enforce their rules differ, as well.
Now, I estimate (10) on two subsamples to test the key assumption that accounting for the
incentive of a country to enforces its transfer-pricing rules is important for correctly specifying a
model of reported profits. In the row labeled Enforcement 2, I report the estimates of the semielasticities of reported profits on the subsample in which the CIT-rate differential is positive or (tG
– tH) > 0. In this case, the affiliate’s host country G has an incentive to enforce its transfer-pricing
rules to mitigate BEPS, but the ultimate owner’s host country does not. Consistent with the theory,
the semi-elasticity for the case in which the host country of the affiliate has the incentive to enforce
its rules is negative and statistically distinguishable from zero at the ten-percent level, but, as
predicted by theory, the estimate when the ultimate owner’s host country enforces its rules but has
no incentive to do so is indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical
significance. I repeat the same exercise on the subsample in which the CIT-rate differential is
negative or (tG – tH) < 0. In this case, the ultimate owner’s host country has an incentive to enforce
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its rules but the foreign affiliate’s host country does not. The estimated semi-elasticities for this
subsample are reported in the row labelled Enforcement model 2. Consistent with the theory, the
semi-elasticity for the case in which the ultimate owner’s host country has the incentive to enforce
its rules, which is reported in column 3 of Table 5, is negative and statistically different from zero
at conventional levels of significance. And, as predicted by the theory, the estimate for the case in
which the foreign affiliate’s host country enforces its rules but has no incentive to do so because
(tG – tH) < 0 is indistinguishable from zero at conventional levels of statistical significance. These
placebo estimates provide important evidence that is consistent with the theory. In specifying a
model of reported profits, the functional form should be sufficiently flexible to permit the
estimation of three semi-elasticities of reported profits. Furthermore, the construction of the
enforcement dummy variable should account for not only whether the country has adopted rules
and enforces them but should also account for whether the country has the incentive to enforce its
rules given the tax incentives facing domestic affiliates of MNEs engaging in intracompany
transactions with foreign affiliates. The estimated coefficients obtained from these two subsamples
are reported in columns 2 and 3, respectively, of Table 7.
To gauge the robustness of the main results to alternative specifications, estimate a
specification of the model in which I add a control variable for political stability. The estimated
coefficients of this specification are reported in columns 1-3 of Table 8. This model is estimated
on the full sample and the two subsamples previously described. The estimated coefficients have
the expected signs and statistical significance. Next, I examine the robustness of my main findings
to an alternative definition of the stringency with which a country enforces its rules. More
specifically, I redefine γGt and γHt to be equal to one when the constructed categorical variable for
the frequency of applying penalties is equal to or greater than six rather than four as in the case of
the previous specifications. The estimated coefficients of this specification are reported in columns
4-6 of Table 8. Again, I estimate this specification on the full sample and the two subsamples
previously described. The estimated coefficients of this specification have the expected signs and
statistical significance.

6. Policy simulation
To illustrate the practical consequences for tax policy analysis of correctly specifying the empirical
model of reported profits, I report describe the results of a policy simulation in this section. For
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purposes of the simulation, I assume the United States reduces its CIT rate by 20 percent. A 20
percent cut in the top statutory CIT rate of the U.S. would be equivalent to a tax rate of 15 percent,
instead of the current-law rate of 35 percent. This proposal is particularly relevant because the
United States has one of the highest top statutory CIT rates in the world, and there is an ongoing
policy debate about the merits of the United States reducing its top statutory CIT rate to make it
more competitive with that of other countries.
For the sake of comparison, I use the estimated semi-elasticities for reported profits
obtained from the First–generation model reported and Enforcement model 1, which are reported
in the corresponding rows of Table 5, to provide two estimates of the policy simulation. The
estimates for the policy simulation based on the First-generation model of the effect of the proposal
on the percent change in reported CIT revenue by country and on the percent change in aggregate
reported firm EBIT by country are reported in columns two and three, respectively, of Table 9,
Similarly, the estimates for the policy simulation based on the Enforcement 1 model are reported
in columns four and five, of Table 9.7
There are three noteworthy findings in Table 9. First, every country, except the United
States, experiences a decrease in aggregate reported firm revenue. In contrast, the U.S. experiences
an increase in aggregate reported firm revenue as a result. Second, every country, including the
U.S., experiences a decrease in CIT revenue. In the case of the U.S., this finding shows that the
increase in the CIT tax base or aggregate reported firm revenue is not large enough to offset the
effect of the 20 percent reduction in the U.S. CIT rate. For the other countries, the decrease in CIT
revenues is proportional to the decrease in the country’s CIT tax base as a result of the proposal
because they do not change their current-law CIT rate. Third, and most importantly for the
purposes at hand, the estimated effect of the proposed reform on the percent decrease in CIT
revenues for the U.S. is 15 percentages points smaller using estimates obtained from the
Enforcement 1 model relative to that based on the First-generation model. In sum, this exercise
illustrates the practical importance of using a correctly specified model to estimate the effect on
reported profits of CIT-rate differentials for tax policy analysis.

7

The simulation for the first generation model I used column 1 if Table 6. 7 To run the simulation for the
enforcement model I used column 4 if Table 6
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7. Conclusions
As globalization increases so has international tax competition among countries to attract
foreign direct investment. The resulting CIT-rate differentials among countries is leading to BEPS
as MNEs shift profits from affiliates located in high CIT-rate countries to affiliates located in low
CIT rate countries to minimize their aggregate tax liabilities thus increasing their worldwide aftertax profits.
This paper seeks to gauge the effect of CIT-rate differentials among countries on BEPS. I
improve upon the existing literature by accounting for whether countries actually enforce their
transfer-pricing rules and when they have the incentive to do so because of the tax incentives facing
domestic affiliates of MNEs. I report strong evidence that correctly specifying the model of
reported profits in the manner prescribed in this paper has important implications for the correct
choice of function form and a substantial effect on the estimated semi-elasticities of reported
profits. I also conduct a policy simulation to illustrate the practical importance to tax policy
analysis. I use my preferred estimates of the semi-elasticities of reported profits as well as an
estimate of this semi-elasticity using a state-of-the-art but misspecified model to conduct the policy
simulation. This exercise shows that using estimates of the semi-elasticities from a correctly
specified model has a substantial effect on the estimated tax revenue effect of the proposed reform.
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Figure 1. The Optimal Reported Profits of Affiliate g with Respect to the Corporate
Income Tax Rate Differential between Countries G and H

𝜋𝐻𝑅
C

E

𝑇

A

B
F
D
(0,0)

tH - tG

Note: The slope of the line segment labelled ̅̅̅̅
𝐶𝐷 corresponds to 𝛽1 in the econometric
specification (10), when 𝛾𝐺 = 𝛾𝐻 = 0. The slope of the line segment labelled ̅̅̅̅
𝑇𝐹 is corresponds
to 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 in the econometric specification (10), when 𝛾𝐺 > 0 and 𝛾𝐻 = 0. The slope of the line
̅̅̅̅ corresponds to 𝛽1 + 𝛽3 in the econometric specification, when 𝛾𝐺 = 0 and
segment labeled 𝐸𝑇
𝛾𝐻 = 0.
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Table 1. Number of affiliates in the sample by country
Country
1. Australia
2. Austria
3. Belgium
4. Britain
5. Cyprus
6. Czech
7. Denmark
8. Estonia
9. Finland
10. France
11. Germany
12. Hong Kong
13. Iceland
14. Ireland
15. Italy
16. Japan
17. Luxembourg
18. Netherlands
19. New Zealand
20. Norway
21. Portugal
22. Slovakia
23. Slovenia
24. South Korea
25. Spain
26. Sweden
27. Switzerland
28. United States
Total number of affiliates

Number of affiliates
5
895
2,959
4,386
39
3,108
1,194
631
886
6,161
3,584
5
14
743
4,044
156
40
779
725
1,273
1,858
1,892
546
995
3,838
2280
46
21
43,103
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Table 2. Host countries of the ultimate owners (in alphabetical order)
Country
Andorra
Angola
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Bahamas
Bahrain
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Bermuda
Bosnia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Canada
Cayman Isl.
Chile
China
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Ecuador
Egypt
Estonia
Finland
France
Georgia
Germany

Number
Country
of firms
10
9
13
490
1,300
30
3
2
2
1,058
198
5
60
31
450
196
18
319
14
2
47
287
291
1,281
1
3
18
777
2,957
1
6,107

Greece
Guinea-Bissau
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Japan
Korea, Republic of
Kuwait
Latvia
Lebanon
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macedonia
Malaysia
Malta
Marshall Islands
Mauritius
Mexico
Monaco
Morocco
Namibia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Panama

Number
Country
of firms
42
1
165
73
52
291
4
504
172
1,825
2,295
231
24
34
36
107
43
1626
1
58
104
17
21
50
22
8
1
1,992
63
811
67

Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Russian Federation
Saint Vincent
Saudi Arabia
Serbia
Seychelles
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
Ukraine
UAE
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Venezuela
Viet Nam
Total

Number
of firms
1
3
184
255
26
102
4
24
10
21
174
87
40
50
1,171
4
1,726
1,961
1
142
12
10
73
43
91
2,921
7,234
3
8
2
43,103
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Table 3. Coding of the categorical variables according to a country’s transferpricing documentation requirements and application penalties for violations
Documentation requirements
Report

Information
provided in the
report

KPMG’s
Transfer Pricing
Review
Are transferpricing required
to be submitted
on an annual
basis?

Coding

Penalties applied for violations

EY’s Worldwide
KPMG’s
Transfer Pricing
Transfer
Reference Guide
Pricing Review
Documentation
To what extent
requirements and
are transfer
return disclosures
pricing
and related-party
penalties
disclosures
enforced?
Answers to the questions stated above

EY’s Worldwide
Transfer Pricing
Reference Guide
Audit
risk/transfer
pricing scrutiny

No

No documentation
required.

Never

None

1

No, but
documents need
to be prepared
when requested

Documents are
required when a
firm is audited and
a firm has some
time to prepare
them.

Not often

Low risk

2

No, but
documents need
to prepared
along with the
tax return

Documents need
to be ready when
requested.

Increasing

Medium risk

Yes

Documents need
to be summited
with the annual
CIT return

Often or always

High risk

0

3
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Table 4. Summary statistics for the full sample (number of observations = 190,862)
Variable

Mean

Standard
Minimum Maximum
deviation

Source

CIT-rate differential (tG – tH)

-0.022

0.090

-0.425

0.407

Author

Average CIT-rate differential

0.009

0.041

-0.167

0.190

Author

Enforcement regime by the
subsidiary’s host country

0.259

0.438

0.000

1.000

Author

Enforcement by the ultimate
owner’s host country

0.656

0.475

0.000

1.000

Author

Transfer-pricing rules in the
subsidiary’s host country

0.991

0.091

0.000

1.000

Author

0.909

0.288

0.000

1.000

EY, KPMG

0.149

0.357

0.000

1.000

EY, KPMG

0.086

0.280

0.000

1.000

EY, KPMG

Log(subsidiary’s reported profits)

6.426

1.836

-11.236

15.614

ORBIS

Log(value of fixed assets)

6.559

2.626

-6.001

17.635

Author

Log(labor costs)

7.610

1.554

-4.977

16.486

Author

Log(GDP per capita)

10.521

0.386

9.592

11.667

ORBIS

Index of trade freedomc

68.442

15.544

38.500

96.000

ORBIS

Index of political stability

0.698

0.392

-0.466

1.514

World Bank

Transfer-pricing rules in the
ultimate owner’s host country
Transfer-pricing documentation
required by the subsidiary’s host
country
Transfer-pricing documentation
required by the ultimate owner’s
host country
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Table 5. Instrumental variable estimates of the semi-elasticity of reported profits

Empirical specification

Semi-elasticity of reported profits
β1 + β2
β1 + β3
β1
(country H has no
(country G has no
(without transferincentive to enforce incentive to enforce
pricing rules)
its transfer-pricing
its transfer-pricing
rules)
rules)
Models are estimated on the full sample

First-generation model

-1.789***

-

-

Second-generation model A

-1.589***

-1.039

-

Second-generation model B

-9.435*

-1.811***

-

Enforcement model 1

-3.54***

-3.063*

-1.286**

Model is estimated on the subsample in which tG – tH > 0
Enforcement model 2

-4.741*

-3.225*

-1.648

Models are estimated on the subsample in which tG – tH < 0
Enforcement model 3

-4.438*

-4.040

-1.041*

Note: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). The
second-generation model A includes a dummy variable = 1 if the subsidiary’s host country requires transfer-pricing
documentation to be submitted with the affiliate’s annual CIT return and zero otherwise. The second-generation model
B includes a dummy variable = 1 if the for the subsidiary’s host country has adopted transfer-pricing rules and zero
otherwise. The enforcement model includes a dummy variable = 1 if the host country of the subsidiary enforces transferpricing rules. The instrument for the potentially endogenous variable (CIT-rate differential) is the log of the difference
in populations of the two countries.
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Table 6. Instrumental variable estimates of alternative models of reported profits
Empirical specification
Second
Second
generation A
generation B

Variable

First
generation

IT-rate differential
(tG – tH )
Transfer-pricing documentation
required by subsidiary’s host
country (TPD-SHC)

-1.798***
(0.633)

-1.589***
(0.512)

-9.435*
(5.002)

-3.540***
(1.244)

-

0.050**
(0.023)

-

-

TPD-SHC×(tG – tH )

-

0.550
(0.352)

-

-

Existence of transfer-pricing
rules in the subsidiary’s country
(ETPR-SHC)

-

-

1.441*
(0.810)

-

ETPR-SHC ×(tG – tH )

-

-

7.624*
(4.379)

-

Enforcement by subsidiary’s
host country (E-SHC)

-

-

-

E-SHC ×(tG – tH )

-

-

-

Enforcement by ultimate
owner’s host country (E-UHC)

-

-

-

E-OHC ×(tG – tH )

-

-

-

0.045***
(0.003)
0.447***
(0.006)
0.788***
(0.037)
0.012***
(0.002)

0.045***
(0.003)
0.447***
(0.006)
0.795***
(0.037)
0.012***
(0.002)

0.045***
(0.003)
0.447***
(0.006)
0.776***
(0.034)
0.012***
(0.002)

-0.026
(0.019)
0.477**
(0.189)
-0.081***
(0.019)
2.254**
(0.928)
0.045***
(0.003)
0.448***
(0.006)
0.804***
(0.034)
0.014***
(0.002)

190,862

190,862

190,862

190,862

R-squared

0.048

0.048

0.045

0.048

Number of subsidiaries

38,314

38,314

38,314

38,314

Log(value of fixed assets)
Log(labor costs)
Log(GDP per capita)
Index of trade freedom
Number of observations

Enforcement
model

Notes: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT).
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE clusters are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates
statistical significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels. The unit of observation is active subsidiaries
of MNEs by year. All specifications include affiliate-level fixed effects. Each specification also includes 130 industryyear dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 1-digit level).
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Table 7. Instrumental variable estimates of the enforcement model of reported profits
Sample
CIT-rate
differential
is positive
(tG – tH) > 0

CIT-rate
differential
is negative
(tG – tH) < 0

-3.540***
(1.244)

-4.741*
(1.172)

-4.438*
(1.809)

Existence of transfer-pricing rules in the
subsidiary’s host country (ETPR-SHC)

-0.001
(0.020)

-0.081***
(0.031)

0.008
(0.036)

ETPR-SHC×(tG – tH)

0.477**
(0.189)

1.516*
(0.900)

0.392
(0.336)

Existence of transfer-pricing rules in the
ultimate owner’s host country (ETPR-UHC)

-0.026
(0.019)

-0.161
(0.214)

0.092
(0.078)

ETPR-UHC×(tG – tH)

2.254**
(0.928)

3.093
(4.311)

3.397**
(1.600)

Log(value of fixed assets)

0.045***
(0.003)

0.042***
(0.005)

0.044***
(0.004)

Log(labor costs)

0.448***
(0.006)

0.433***
(0.010)

0.462***
(0.008)

Log(GDP per capita)

0.804***
(0.034)

0.733***
(0.065)

0.857***
(0.043)

Index of trade freedom

0.0138***
(0.002)

0.0171***
(0.003)

0.0120***
(0.003)

Number of observations

190,862

80,702

107,730

R-squared

0.048

0.041

0.053

Number of affiliates

38,314

17,137

22,475

Variable

CIT-rate differential (tG – tH)

Full

Notes: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT).
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE clusters are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates
statistical significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels. The unit of observation is active subsidiaries
of MNEs by year. All specifications include affiliate-level fixed effects. Each specification also includes 130 industryyear dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 1-digit level).
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Table 8. Robustness of the main results to the inclusion of a political stability index and to an alternative
definition of enforcement
Variable

Includes an index of political stability
Sample

Alternative definition of enforcement
Sample

Full

(tG – tH) > 0

(tG – tH) < 0

Full

(tG – tH) > 0

(tG – tH) < 0

-3.518***
(1.245)

-6.217*
(4.920)

-4.049**
(1.806)

-2.977***
(1.006)

-2.709
(5.297)

-2.980**
(1.260)

-0.0111
(0.0209)

-0.0921***
(0.0303)

-0.00869
(0.0363)

0.006
(0.023)

-0.043
(0.052)

0.007
(0.035)

E-SHC×(tG – tH)

0.393**
(0.192)

1.637*
(0.881)

0.266
(0.337)

0.661***
(0.233)

0.682*
(0.253)

0.464
(0.338)

Enforcement by
ultimate owner’s host
county (E-UHC)

-0.0236
(0.0188)

-0.219
(0.205)

0.0818
(0.0782)

0.044**
(0.018)

0.113
(0.168)

0.024
(0.064)

4.290
(4.107)
0.042***
(0.00499)

3.087*
(1.596)

1.715**
(0.679)

1.853
(2.841)

2.272*
(1.214)

Log(value of fixed
assets)

2.237**
(0.929)
0.045***
(0.00301)

0.044***
(0.004)

0.045***
(0.003)

0.044***
(0.005)

0.044***
(0.004)

Log(labor costs)

0.450***
(0.006)

0.433***
(0.010)

0.462***
(0.009)

0.448***
(0.006)

0.428***
(0.011)

0.463***
(0.008)

Log(GDP per capita)

0.447***
(0.00613)

0.433***
(0.00959)

0.844***
(0.0436)

0.794***
(0.035)

0.770***
(0.068)

0.849***
(0.044)

Index of trade freedom

0.013***
(0.002)

0.015***
(0.003)

0.015***
(0.002)

0.01
(0.003)

0.012***
(0.003)

Political stability index

0.0719***
(0.0195)

0.0779**
(0.0308)

0.0109***
(0.003)
0.0827***
(0.0263)

-

-

-

190,862

80,702

107,730

190,862

80,702

107,730

0.048

0.041

0.053

0.048

0.041

0.053

38,314

17,137

22,475

38,314

17,137

22,475

CIT-rate differential
(tG – tH)
Enforcement by
subsidiary’s host
county (E-SHC)

E-UHC×(tG – tH)

Number of
observations
R-squared
Number of affiliates

Notes: The dependent variable in these models is the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). The estimates of
reported in right-hand-side panel of the table uses an alternative definition the dummy variable for a country’s enforcement of transferpricing rules. The dummy variable = 1.0 when the constructed categorical variable is greater than or equal to 5 (rather than 4) and zero
otherwise. Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors adjusted for MNE clusters are reported in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ indicates statistical
significance at the 10-percent, 5-percent, and 1-percent levels. The unit of observation is active subsidiaries of MNEs by year. All
specifications include affiliate-level fixed effects. Each specification also includes 130 industry-year dummy variables (NACE Rev.1 1digit level).
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Table 9. Policy simulation of the effect of the United States decreasing its CIT rate by 20 percent
Based on the first-generation model
Based on the enforcement model
Percent change
Percent change
Percent change
in the sum of
Percent change
in the sum of
Country
in tax revenue by
affiliate’s
in tax revenue by
affiliate’s
country
reported profits by
country
reported profits by
country
country
Austria

-4.48

-4.48

-2.53

-2.53

Belgium

-5.79

-5.79

-4.34

-4.34

Britain

-8.33

-8.33

-6.25

-6.25

Czech

-3.22

-3.22

-2.41

-2.41

Denmark

-5.40

-5.40

-2.67

-2.67

Estonia

-1.76

-1.76

-1.32

-1.32

Finland

-5.13

-5.13

-3.85

-3.85

France

-4.88

-4.88

-3.66

-3.66

Germany

-5.29

-5.29

-2.62

-2.62

Iceland

-4.32

-4.32

-3.24

-3.24

Ireland

-9.03

-9.03

-6.78

-6.78

Italy

-5.03

-5.03

-3.77

-3.77

Japan

-6.27

-6.27

-4.71

-4.71

Netherlands

-5.91

-5.91

-4.43

-4.43

New Zealand

-8.91

-8.91

-6.69

-6.69

Norway

-3.22

-3.22

-2.42

-2.42

Portugal

-3.09

-3.09

-1.53

-1.53

Slovakia

-2.31

-2.31

-1.63

-1.64

Slovenia

-2.48

-2.48

-1.86

-1.86

South Korea

-5.56

-5.56

-3.93

-3.93

Spain

-4.65

-4.65

-2.47

-2.47

Sweden

-4.35

-4.35

-3.27

-3.27

United States

-28.36

43.29

-35.55

28.91

Note: The percent change in tax revenue is percent difference in proposed-law tax revenue with respect to current-law tax
revenue by country. The percent change in affiliate’s reported profits is the percent change in the difference in the sum of
affiliates’ reported profits revenue under proposed law with respect to affiliates’ reported profits under current law.

